The Distinction between Certainty and Knowledge of Wittgenstein
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Abstract
This paper is an attempt to analyze and distinguish the concepts of certaintyansknowledge with special reference to the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein, responding to G.E. Moore, makes a distinction between instances of knowledge and those of certainty. From there, interpretations, or at least emphases, splinter and multiply.He first remark of On Certainty, Wittgenstein states: ‘‘If you do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest.’’[1] Despite first appearances, it becomes clear that this is a somewhat sardonic comment, although it is some time before he feels he can state explicitly that ‘Knowledge and certainty belong to different categories’.[2] Ultimately, Wittgenstein denies that Moore knows that he has a hand.
This denial may seem peculiar, but what he is really saying is that Moore is certain that he has a hand, but doesn’t know it, because knowledge and certainty are very different things. The latter, in this context, is not merely an added emphasis upon the former.[3] Instead of claiming knowledge about such things, he insists the question wemust ask is ‘whether it can make sense to doubt it’.[4] He soon returns to this topic, expanding upon it. ‘Now do I, in the course of my life,’ he says, ‘make sure that I know that here is a hand—my own hand, that is?’.[5]We do not. It is something that we take for granted. Taking1. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, (Ed.)Anscombe, G.E.M., Wright, G.H. Von (Tr.) Paul, Denis, Anscombe, G.E.M., 1969 (Basil Blackwell: Oxford) Remark, 1.
2. OC, Remark, 308.
3. Cf OC Remark, 8.
4. OC, Remark, 2.
5. OC, Remark, 9.
References
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, (Ed.) Anscombe, G.E.M., Wright, G.H. Von (Tr.) Paul, Denis, Anscombe, G.E.M., 1969 (Basil Blackwell: Oxford).
Wittgenstein, Ludwig ,Philosophical Investigations, 1953 (Basil Blackwell: Oxford).
Baker, G.P. and Hacker, P.M.S., Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, (Vol. 1) of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, 1980 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
Baker, G.P. and Hacker, P.M.S., Scepticism, Rules and Language, 1984 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
Baker, G.P. and Hacker, P.M.S., Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, (Vol. 2) of An Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, 1992 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
Barcan Marcus, R., ‘Some Revisionary Proposals about Belief and Believing’ in Modern Philosophy of Language (ed.) Bagramian, M., 1990 (London: Dent).
Conway, G.D., Wittgenstein on Foundations, 1989 (New Jersey: Humanities Press International).
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